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Mixed Signals: Cognitive Skills, Qualifications and Earnings in an International 
Comparative Perspective
While it is well-established that education holds value in labour markets, the reasons that 
education is valued are a source of ongoing debate. Bryan Caplan addresses this debate in 
The Case Against Education by making the provocative argument that “there’s way too much 
education” (Caplan, 2018, p. 1). He goes on to argue that the reason for this oversupply of 
education is labour market signalling: students pursue education mainly as a way to show 
potential employers that they are intelligent, hard-working, and obedient individuals, but not 
because it increases their ability to be productive employees.
Caplan resurfaces (but does not resolve) a long-standing debate in the literature on education 
and labour markets: the unique role of education as both an absolute and a positional good 
(Hirsch, 1976). The absolute benefits of education refer to increased productivity and work 
quality that accrue through education. In contrast, the positional aspect of education is used to 
differentiate among competitors in the labor market, even when there are no absolute gains in 
productivity. To use the metaphor of a pie that is divided among members of society, 
education functions as an absolute good by helping individuals to produce a larger pie, but as 
a positional good it also increases the size of an educated individual’s own slice of the pie 
relative to the less educated. Caplan argues that the positional benefits of education dwarf its 
absolute benefits by a ratio of approximately four-to-one (i.e. 80% to 20%), and hence he 
cautions against increasing educational expenditure and attainment.
This paper takes Caplan’s book as a point of departure to examine how formal educational 
qualifications and cognitive skills are related to adults’ earnings in labour markets in middle- 
and high-income countries. Unpicking this relationship involves careful consideration, as the 
relationship between variables is complex with multiple possible causal directions; for 
example, higher cognitive skills are likely to increase the level of education an individual 
attains, just as higher levels education are likely to develop cognitive skills. 
We undertake this analysis using data from the Programme for the International Assessment 
of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), a study run by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) in 30 countries. We begin the paper by reviewing theoretical 
perspectives on skills, qualifications and the labour market, focusing on the distinction 
between human capital theory and signalling. We then discuss the PIAAC data and our 
methods of analysis, logistic regression of earnings at different levels based on cognitive 
skills, educational qualifications, and demographic control variables.  
Our analysis shows that cognitive skills - primarily numeracy - and educational qualifications 
both contribute to higher earnings, but the relative share of these two contributions differs 
substantially across countries. While in some countries (including Caplan’s USA) 
qualifications overshadow cognitive skills, in other cases the two contribute much more 
equally to earnings. Furthermore, the signalling power of qualifications appears to be highest 
in countries with low levels of higher education; in contrast, countries with more university 
graduates in the workforce tend to place greater value on cognitive skills. We conclude by 
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discussing the implications of these findings for theories of education and the labour market 
and educational policy.
Perspectives on Skills, Qualifications and the Labor Market
The relationship between education and the labor market was first addressed as a distinct 
field of study in early work on human capital theory (Mincer, 1958), which established a 
framework for understanding variation in earnings for individuals with different levels of 
education. In its classical form, human capital theory views the higher earnings of more 
educated workers as a return on investment (Becker, 1994), similar to that which might be 
obtained through any form of investment (e.g. real estate, stocks). The time and labor that 
individuals invest in their education factor into the cost of their labour later in life, and thus 
result in both higher productivity and higher earnings. In his critique of human capital, 
Foucault (2004, p.226). thus argues that human capital theory makes every worker “an 
entrepreneur of himself...being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own 
producer, being for himself the source of his earnings.”
Since its inception, human capital theory has gained widespread status as the de facto model 
to conceptualize education and the labour market. Through Rostow’s (1960) modernization 
theory, it became a guiding force behind international development funding from the World 
Bank and other donors (Jones, 2004; Lauder, 2015). Human capital theory remains a focus of 
much research: contemporary work in the field has devoted particular attention to the topic of 
highly skilled labor, analyzing the “skills premium” that it demands in labour markets. For 
example, Autor (2014) argues that the skills premium is growing in most high-income 
countries, but points out that a growing return to skills in the labour market is an intrisic part 
of the growing levels of income inequality experienced in many countries.
However, in the years after the classical formulations of human capital theory, other ways of 
conceptualizing education in the labour market emerged. Signalling (Spence, 1973) and 
screening (Stiglitz, 1975) both posit that education has value in labor markets because it 
reduces uncertainty. According to signalling theory, potential employees use educational 
qualifications as a way to demonstrate their abilities to potential employers. These abilities 
include not only skills used in the performance of the job, but also their work-ethic, ability to 
follow instructions, and dedication to complete tasks. For university graduates, their success 
in competitive admissions processes can also work as a signal of their abilities relative to 
peers (Hoekstra, 2009). Screening theory takes a similar view of education as a 
demonstration of ability, but focuses more on the employers’ role. According to screening 
theory, employers who are uncertain about job applicants’ quality set “wage contracts,” i.e. 
specifications for a salary matching a certain set of educational qualifications (Siglitz, 1975; 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1990). In both signalling and screening theories, some value of education 
is attributed to its role in reducing uncertainty in the labor market rather than developing 
productive skills.
Both signalling and screening theory differ from human capital in that they view education as 
having both positional and absolute benefits, a concept first described by Hirsch (1976). The 
absolute benefits of education are very much akin to the increased productivity and 
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corresponding salary premiums described by human capital theory; in other words, they refer 
to an absolute change in what an employee can do as a result of education. In contrast, 
positional benefits refer to the abilities of an educated employee relative to others who lack 
the same level of education. Particularly in terms of job market selection, an individual is 
likely to benefit from being the most educated applicant for a job (i.e. positionally ahead of 
competitors), even if the additional education one holds adds little or no absolute benefits. 
To further illustrate the distinction between absolute and positional benefits, it is useful to 
imagine the aggregate output of all workers in a given country as a pie, which, after it has 
been baked, is divided up among all the workers who produced it. In this scenario, absolute 
benefits from education would enable an individual to make the overall pie bigger, regardless 
of how it is eventually divided. In contrast, positional benefits would increase the size of an 
individual’s slice of the pie. Hirsch (1976) argues that education both enables individuals to 
make the pie bigger and also allows them to increase their slice of the pie. The balance 
between these two contributions is a key question for research on education and labour 
markets.
As signalling theory emphasizes the importance of qualifications in getting a job over the 
necessity of skills in performing a job, it opens a distinct possibility for graduate 
overeducation in labour markets, generally defined as the percentage of the workforce who 
hold a university degree but work in a job that does not require one (Chevalier, 2003). Many 
studies report some degree of graduate overeducation, but also suggest that the prevalence 
and severity of overeducation tend to vary across national contexts (Barone & Ortiz 2011; 
Cardoso, 2007; McGuinness 2006, Reisel 2013). Brown, Lauder and Ashton (2012) and 
Brown, Lauder and Cheung (2019) further argue that employers’ ability to source skilled 
labour from low-income countries is leading to a long-term deterioration of the skills 
premium in high-income countries, as low-income, high-skills labour markets are able to 
undercut the cost of skills in high-income countries. In combination with other studies 
highlighting variation in returns to skills across countries (Hanushek et al, 2013), the 
literature therefore suggests that the balance between human capital and signalling may be 
largely shaped by national context, pointing to a need to study the issue in an international 
comparative perspective.  
In many senses, Caplan’s argument better reflects another critique of education in the labor 
market: credentialism. In essence, the literature on credentialism argues that educational 
qualifications largely function as an intentional effort of the educated elite to perpetuate class 
advantage by limiting access to desirable jobs (Collins 1979; Dore, 1976). The result is a 
process of degree inflation: as the provision of education has expanded each generation must 
obtain more credentials than the one that preceded it simply to maintain their class position. 
Collins warns of ‘cycle of rising educational attainment and rising occupational 
requirements’ that threatens to continue ‘until janitors need PhDs’ (Collins 2002, 25–29).  
Both the credentialist literature and Caplan emphasize possibilities for self-serving 
institutions that offer little useful education, epitomized in Caplan’s critique of “the head-in-
the-clouds Ivory Tower academic” (p. 11). Thus, although Caplan describes his critique in 
terms of signalling, in many senses he is actually describing credentialism.
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Synopsis
The value of education in the labour market is addressed in debates regarding its absolute and 
positional benefits. On the one hand, human capital theory focuses on the absolute returns to 
skills; and on the other hand credentialist perspectives and Caplan’s (2018) strong version of 
signalling theory argue the contrary. However, Bills (2003) rightly points out that these two 
perspectives are not necessarily oppositional since, absolute and positional benefits are not 
mutually exclusive; in fact, Hirsch shows that both benefits are usually present to some 
extent. Furthermore, it is clear that this dichotomy does not capture all the possible 
dimensions of the role of education in labour markets. For example, we have not considered 
how the absolute benefits of education are distributed. While classical human capital theory 
tends to assume they are retained by the individual, it is equally possible that they are 
retained by employers who seek to maximise profit (Brown et al, 2012), or shared in society 
more widely (Moretti, 2004).
Nevertheless, the debate between human capital and signalling theories is a useful entry point 
to better understand why education holds value in labour markets.  In particular, different 
findings across contexts (Barone & Ortiz 2011; Cardoso, 2007; McGuinness 2006, Reisel 
2013) suggest that an international comparative analysis may yield insights into whether 
education is of little economic value, as Caplan claims.
Data and Methods
To analyse the respective contributions of qualifications and skills to labour market 
outcomes, we use data from the Programme for International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies (PIAAC), an international study run by the OECD in 38 countries. PIAAC is 
intended to measure the skills of the adult population of participating countries on the basis 
that “provide a foundation for effective and successful participation in the social and  
economic  life  of  advanced  economies” (OECD, 2012, p. 10). Framed in the context of 
high-skills economies, PIAAC was administered to respondents on a laptop computer and 
included assessments of literacy, numeracy and problem solving in technology-rich 
environments. The last of these assessments, hereafter referred to as “problem solving,” is 
defined by OECD (2012, p. 47) as 
using digital technology, communication tools and networks to acquire and evaluate 
information, communicate with others and perform practical tasks. The first PIAAC 
problem-solving survey focuses on the abilities to solve problems for personal, work 
and civic purposes by setting up appropriate goals and plans, and accessing and 
making use of information through computers and computer networks
In addition to the three assessments, respondents completed a questionnaire that included 
extensive information on their home life; social background and upbringing; and, where 
relevant, work, career and earnings
We analyze data from PIAAC rounds 1 and 2, which were conducted in 2008-13 and 2012-
16, respectively (OECD, 2016, p. 20). Our analysis includes 27 different countries for which 
the relevant data on cognitive skills and earnings were collected, with an average sample size 
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of 6,517 respondent per country. Responses are weighted to allow inferences about the 
national adult population, with bootstrapped variance estimates using a jackknife replication 
design (Mohadjer, Krenzke, & Van de Kerchove, 2013). 
We analyze respondents between the ages of 25 and 64 who reported being in work at the 
time of data collection (we exclude respondents were in education and work), as respondents 
in this age group are likely to have completed most of their education.  
Our analysis focuses on the contributions of cognitive skills and educational qualifications to 
earnings in the labour market across countries that participated in PIAAC. Conceptually, we 
understand PIAAC data on cognitive skills and qualifications to represent partial measures of 
human capital and signalling, respectively. However, we recognize that there are important 
parts of human capital and signalling that are not captured. Other aspects of human capital 
can include field-specific education, skills aquired through on-the-job training, and expertise 
accrued through experience. We assume that PIAAC scores measure an underlying construct 
– cognitive ability – which would contribute to earnings both in job selection and in post-
selection job performance. Similarly, signalling also includes the status of educational 
institutions (Rivera, 2015) and other affiliations, activities and experience, which are not 
measured here.
 Our focus is therefore on how the ratio of how these two components of human capital and 
signalling contirbute to earnings, and how this ratio varies across countries. Given the sample 
size of PIAAC and the variation in educational qualifications and cognitive skills in the 
populations studied, it is possible to disaggregate how these two variables are related to 
earnings. We do so using a logistic regression of the following form:
(1)  Y = β0 + β1Num + β2Lit + β3PS + β4HE + β5Sec + β6...KX  
Our primary outcome variable (Y) is the probability that an individual earns above a given 
decile in their country’s earnings distribution, for example, the probability of earning above 
the 70th percentile (or more than 70% of other people in the country). We use a dichotomous 
outcome variable and logistic regression because of the way that income data are reported in 
PIAAC. While PIAAC does collect raw earnings data (i.e. earnings in dollars), these data are 
missing for seven countries. Countries with missing earnings data include the United States 
(the focus of Caplan’s analysis) as well as countries with relatively important and unique 
models of skills in the labour market, for example, Germany and Singapore. Since all these 
countries include relative earnings in deciles, this outcome variable presents the best 
opportunity for international comparative study. However, the use of earnings percentiles 
also prevents cross-country analysis of differences in earnings.
We, therefore, use “premium” to denote an increased probability of attaining a given income 
level relative to the rest of the national population, rather than an increase measured in 
monetary terms. While the two approaches to measuring the returns to skills are conceptually 
similar, it is important to understand the distinction between an increased probability of 
relative earnings at a given level and an increase in absolute earnings.
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The dependent variable Y is analyzed as an outcome of a series of variables from the PIAAC 
survey. These variables include the individual’s scores on the PIAAC numeracy, literacy and 
problem-solving assessments (Num, Lit, PS, respectively), with the relation to earnings 
captured in coefficients β1, β2, and β3, respectively. Additionally, the relationship between 
qualifications and earnings is analyzed through the dummy variables indicating whether the 
individual’s highest qualification is a higher education degree (D) or a secondary school 
diploma (S), relative to a reference group who have not completed secondary school. 
PIAAC reports respondents’ highest level of completed formal education coded in six ordinal 
levels based on the International Standard Classification of Education:
1. Lower secondary or less (ISCED 1,2, 3C short or less)
2. Upper secondary (ISCED 3A-B, C long)
3. Post-secondary, non-tertiary (ISCED 4A-B-C)
4. Tertiary – professional degree (ISCED 5B)
5. Tertiary – bachelor degree (ISCED 5A)
6. Tertiary – master/research degree (ISCED 5A/6)
For the purposes of analysis we distinguish between three different levels of education: less 
than secondary school (level 1 in the PIAAC classification), completed secondary school 
(level 2) and “higher education” (levels 3 - 7). We use the term “higher education” loosely to 
encompass both tertiary and non-tertiary post-secondary education; while recognizing the 
formal distinction between the two categories, international differences in the structure of 
post-secondary education makes a combined consideration the most insightful approach (see 
Barakat and Shields, 2019 for further discussion on the amalgamation of these categories). 
All amalgamation of categories therefore occurs at the post-secondary level (i.e. ISCED 
levels 4 to 7). Without algamating ISCED levels, results become somewhat incomparable 
across countries due to the different nature of their post-secondary education systems. For 
example, in the United Kingdom, nontertiary post-secondary education (ICSED 4) has a 
significantly negative coefficient, as vocational qualifications are also regarded as second-tier 
in the labour market (Shields and Masardo, 2018).  In countries with more coordinated 
economies, the value of a “professional degress” (ISCED 5B) is greater than or similar to a 
“bachelor’s degree” (ISCED 5A, e.g. in Austria, Germany and the Czech Republic), while in 
liberal economies the bachelor’s degree has a greater link to earnings (e.g. the UK, Ireland 
and New Zealand). Because of these differences in the nature of post-secondary education 
across countries, the analysis has the most coherency when all types of post-secondary 
education are considered together. The appendix shows a breakdown of the relationship 
between earnings and qualifications across all six levels of the qualification coding.
In order to disaggregate the skills and qualifications from other social characteristics, we 
control for confounding variables (represented in the matrix X) that may be associated with 
both cognitive skills and educational qualifications. Socioeconomic status is particularly 
important given the large literature on the reproduction of social status through education 
(Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990) and the strong relationship between socioeconomic status and 
educational outcomes (Jehangir, Glas and van der Berg, 2015). To control for socioeconomic 
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status, our model includes parents’ highest completed educational qualification using the 
same three-level coding (less than secondary, secondary, higher education) and we include an 
ordinal measure of the number of books respondents reported in their childhood home. We 
also use control for the earnings premiums associated with particular educational fields using 
a simple three-level coding: (1) business, law and social science (2), science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics (STEM) and (3) other fields. While this is a coarse analysis of 
complex and subtle differences between fields, it is the best available way to disaggregate 
educational qualification from fields of study. Finally, we include respondents’ gender (using 
the binary coding employed in PIAAC) and age, measured in five-year intervals. The 
relationship between these variables and earnings is captured in the coefficients β6...K.
We estimate model parameters (i.e. β0 to βk) in two ways. First, we perform the regression 
independently for each country in the PIAAC dataset, resulting in a different set of 
parameters for each country. We also use different income thresholds for the dichotomous 
outcome Y, ranging from earnings above the 20th percentile to the 90th percentile (in decile 
increments), and we perform the regression with every threshold for every country. These 
results are used for the visual presentation of results in Figures 1 to 4 below. Second, we 
perform the regression model across the entire PIAAC dataset using a random intercepts 
model (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). This allows more general conclusions about the relationship 
between cognitive skills, qualifications and earnings, as well the ability to concisely report a 
complete set of results that include control variables.
Results
In using income deciles as an outcome, a preliminary question concerns how relationships in 
the model vary earnings across the income distribution. In other words, when the outcome Y 
is set to a different income threshold (e.g. the 80th percentile versus the 50th), do the 
parameters in the model change? If this were the case, the premiums of skills and 
qualifications would have to be considered at each point in the income distribution. However 
Figure 1 shows that returns to both qualifications and skills are relatively consistent across 
the earnings distribution from percentiles 20 to 90; however, the confidence interval becomes 
much larger at the 90th percentile. Thus, while education may allow individuals to attain 
higher levels of income, there is much less certainty around how it relates to the highest 
levels of income. Based on these results, we proceed to show results using an outcome of 
earning above the 70th percentile below; results for other income thresholds (presented in the 
appendix) are broadly similar.
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Figure 1: Relationship between secondary education qualifications, higher education qualifications and 
total skills and the probability of earning above income deciles 20 to 90. Results show that the 
premium from secondary education is constant across the income distribution, while higher education 
and cognitive skills increase slightly. The confidence interval around the 90th percentile is much wider 
than for lower earnings, suggestion that the relationship between education and very high earnings is 
uncertain.
The contributions of educational qualifications and cognitive skills can be analyzed in both 
absolute and relative terms. An analysis of the absolute contributions focuses on the size of 
the association between income and either (or both) factors. In some labour markets, the 
contributions of both factors may be high, while in others earnings may be largely unrelated 
to skill and qualifications. In contrast, assessing the relative contribution involves comparing 
the contribution of educational qualifications to the skills that it supposedly reflects: in other 
words, the relative contribution is the ratio of the qualifications contribution to the skills 
contribution.
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Female  Secondary Education 0.272
(0.138)




Between Group Variation (σβ0) 0.323 0.319
Table 1: Results from the random intercepts model for all countries in the analysis. The dependent 
variable is the log odds ratio of earning above the 70th income percentile Regression coefficients for 
continuous variables (i.e. cognitive skills, age, and childhood books at home) are presented in 
standardized coefficients.
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Table 1 shows the results from the parameter estimates across all countries, using a random 
intercepts model (Pinheiro and Bates, 2000); thus the relationship between qualifications, 
cognitive skills and earnings is assumed to be fixed across countries. Results show that across 
the 27 countries studied, the earnings power of higher education overshadows most other 
factors, including all cognitive skills combined. Sadly, the only stronger predictor of earning 
above the 70th percentile is gender, with females much less likely to receive these earnings 
than males. Among the control variables, another interesting finding is the strength of 
business and law, which has a greater earnings premium than STEM fields. While our 
international comparative analysis focuses on differences between countries, these results 
show that across all countries there is a tendency for qualifications to contribute more to 
earnings than cognitive skills. However, cross-country averages still allow for substantial 
differences between countries, particularly if the relationship between cognitive skills, 
qualifications and earnigns is moderated by national context.
Among cognitive skills, numeracy has the strongest earnings premium followed by problem-
solving. While the premium from literacy skills is not distinguishable from zero across all 
countries (i.e. it is non-significant), it is nevertheless retained in the analysis of skills below 
because in some countries it is an important component of skills-related earnings. Overall, 
results from Model 1 support the notion that higher education has a strong signalling value 
across countries, because its earning premium is many times that associated with variation in 
skills. Comparing the coefficients of qualifications and cognitive skills is challenging because 
they are measured on different scales, how ver the normally distributed scaling of PIAAC 
cognitive scores provides a way to compare coefficients with respect to the larger population. 
For example, the average premium of a degree across countries (0.890 in Model 2) is of a 
similar magnitude to a 3.38 standard deviation increase in numeracy (0.890  0.263 = 3.38). 
Thus, to equal the earnings power of a degree based on numeracy skills, an individual needs 
to outperform above the third standard deviation in numeracy, higher than 99.9% of the 
population! Further strategies for comparing cognitive skills scores and qualifications are 
employed in the cross-national analysis below.
Model 2 extends the analysis by adding an interaction term between gender and 
qualifications. This adds the important insight that across all 27 countries, the earnings 
premium of a degree is greater for females. Thus, signalling also has some benefit in that it 
signals equal ability and reduces unjust prejudice and discrimination.
However, Figure 2 goes into greater detail by showing the relationship between educational 
qualifications, skills and earnings premium across 27 countries in the PIAAC study. The 
association between higher education earnings (β4) and secondary education and earnings (β5) 
is shown as a solid circle and square, respectively, and countries are ordered from lowest to 
highest on their values for these two data points. They are connected by a dashed line to show 
the range of returns associated qualifications when controlling for cognitive skills and other 
social and demographic factors. These values, therefore, represent the closest measure of 
“signalling” that can be obtained from the data, as they are essentially the earnings value of 
qualifications when cognitive skills are removed.
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Figure 2: The probability of earning above the 70th income percentile as an outcome of higher 
education qualifications, secondary education qualifications, and one standard deviation of cognitive 
skills in 27 different countries. Results show that in some countries, the premium from qualifications is 
comparable to “typical” variation in cognitive skills (i.e. one standard deviation), while in other 
countries it is many times higher. 
The total returns to skills are shown as an unfilled circle, which represents the sum of the 
coefficients for Numeracy, Literacy, and Problem Solving (i.e. β1 + β2 + β3). Since the 
cognitive skills variables are standardized, this point represents the premium for an individual 
who is one standard deviation above average on numeracy, literacy, and problem solving 
within each country. 
Several key findings emerge from this figure. First, the relationship between qualifications 
and earnings varies considerably between countries. In some countries such as Estonia (EE), 
Canada (CA) and Japan (JP) qualifications have a minimal relationship to earnings while in 
other countries such as the United States (US), Austria (AT), Turkey (TK) there is a strong 
relationship between qualifications and earnings. As one might expect, in nearly all countries, 
a higher education degree (filled circle) has a greater earnings premium than a secondary 
school qualification (filled square).
Second, the relative contributions of cognitive skills and qualifications also vary across 
countries. For example, in Denmark (DK), Canada (CA), Norway (NO), and Ireland (IE), the 
contributions of a one standard deviation increase in cognitive skills are comparable to those 
from higher education, and greater than those from secondary education. In other countries, 
the value of cognitive skills is comparable to higher education, for example in the United 
Kingdom (GB), Germany (DE) and Singapore (SG), the earnings associated with one 
standard deviation of cognitive skills are between those of secondary and higher education 
qualification. However, in countries such as the United States (US), Slovakia (SK) and 
Greece (GR), the contribution of skills is much less than qualifications. In these contexts, 
even an individual who was two standard deviations above average in their cognitive skills 
(i.e. more skilled than 97% of the population) would still have less chance of a high income 
than someone with a university degree. It is particularly noteworthy that in the United States, 
the focus of most of Caplan’s analysis, the gap between cognitive skills and qualifications is 
the largest of all countries.
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Third, the premium from cognitive skills is not associated with the qualifications premium. In 
other words, looking from left to right across the graph, the cognitive skills premium largely 
forms a flat line. While there is considerable variation from country to country, there is no 
trend such that the cognitive skills premium increases (or decreases) with the qualifications 
premium. Therefore, it also follows that the two types of premium are not at odds with one 
another; a higher premium on qualifications does not mean a lower premium on cognitive 
skills, and vice versa.
Figure 3: The probability of earning above the 70th income percentile as an outcome of higher 
education qualifications, secondary education qualifications, and the cognitive skills associated with 
these levels of education skills in 27 different countries. Results show that the contributions of skills 
and qualifications varies considerably across countries. 
Figure 3 develops the analysis further by linking the cognitive skills to the averages obtained 
in each country’s education system. Rather than the somewhat arbitrary measure of a one 
standard deviation increase in cognitive skills, the skills gain associated with each level of 
education is multiplied by benefits from skills to estimate cognitive skills from education, 
shown in a hollow square and circle for secondary and higher education, respectively. Caplan 
rightly warns of an “achievement bias,” the assumption that cognitive gains are caused by 
education rather than individuals achieving to a level that matches their own intellectual 
ability. To address this concern, our estimates of the skills gained from education are 
conditioned on the same control variables (X) used in the analysis of earnings, such that the 
influences of factors such as home resources and socioeconomic status are mitigated.
Results show similar results to those in Figure 2, namely that there is considerable variation 
across countries in the relative contributions of qualifications and cognitive skills to earnings. 
Particularly at the level of secondary education (square point markers), the value of cognitive 
skills gained in education exceeds the value of the qualification itself in many countries. The 
value of cognitive skills from higher education is less clear. On the one hand, across most 
countries’ university graduates have higher levels of cognitive skills than individuals with a 
secondary school qualification.  However, since university graduates would also have 
completed secondary education, the value-added by cognitive skills from higher education is 
quite low (i.e. the gap between the outlined circle and the outlined square). There are two 
possible explanations for this result: the first is that higher education is generally not intended 
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to develop the generic cognitive skills measured by PIAAC (i.e. numeracy, literacy and 
problem solving). Instead, it provides specialised, specific skills and perhaps other generic 
skills that are not measured by PIAAC, for example, critical thinking, intercultural 
communication and teamwork. The second explanation, in line with Caplan’s argument, is 
that most of the value of higher education is due to signalling. 
More important than the absolute ratio of “signal” to “skills,” the analysis is important in 
showing variation in this ratio across countries. In particular, cross-national analysis shows 
that the high signalling value of higher education in the United States is not inevitable, but 
rather occurs by design (Hansen, 2011). Other countries show that it is possible to align 
education systems and labour markets such that the value of educational qualifications more 
closely matches generic cognitive skills; when one considers that these qualifications also 
“bundle” other benefits not measured in PIAAC’s cognitive skills, including specialised skills 
and generic non-cognitive skills, the “case against education” is replaced with a recognition 
of its value for individuals and societies.
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Figure 4: The higher education qualifications premium and cognitive skills premium in relation to the 
prevalence of higher education in 27 countries. Results show that countries with a greater share of the 
workforce who have completed higher education have a lower qualifications premium but a higher 
cognitive skills premium
If signalling occurs by design rather than as an inevitable consequence of education systems, 
then a key question is concerns the reasons that particular education systems and labour 
markets produce high signalling values. One explanation is shown in Figure 4, which plots 
the prevalence of qualifications and skills within a country against the premium associated 
with qualifications and skills. In both the top and bottom panels, the horizontal axis 
represents the percentage of the labour force who hold a higher education qualification. In the 
top panel, the vertical axis represents the earnings premiums for higher education 
qualifications (β4); results show that, on average, as degree prevalence increases the 
Page 14 of 28
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/oxfordreview  Email: joanne.hazell@education.ox.ac.uk





























































For Peer Review Only
qualifications premium decreases. Thus, as the prevalence of a degree goes up, the earnings 
premium associated with the degree goes down. What Autor (2014, p. 847) refers to as 
“remarkable explanatory power” of the “simple supply-demand framework” may apply not 
only to skills, but also to signalling; as the number of workers with degrees increases, the 
signalling power of degrees must decline. In the bottom panel, the vertical axis corresponds 
to the premium from cognitive skills (β1 + β2 + β3); results show that in countries with higher 
degree prevalence, the value of cognitive skills in the labour market actually increases.
Combined, both panels show that the systems that Caplan might view as most desirable, i.e. a 
low return to qualifications (signalling) but a high return to skills, are actually those with 
greater access to higher education. While one might well disregard Russia as an anomalous 
case, countries such as Canada (CA), Ireland (IE), Norway (NO), New Zealand (NZ) and 
Singapore (SO) show that education systems that allow wider access to higher education also 
provide a high return to cognitive skills and place a low signalling value on higher education. 
Rather than a tradeoff between access to higher education and an earnings premium for skills, 
the two variables go hand-in-hand.  Countries that value knowledge, or that have economies 
that require knowledgeable employees, are likely to reward these skills in the labour market 
and have more of a comparatively large share of the population who complete higher 
education. Thus, the results show that expanded access to higher education is also compatible 
(and associated) with an economic value placed on knowledge rather than on qualifications.
Thus, the supply of qualifications and their value in the labour market provides one 
explanation of the differences observed between countries in Figure 4. However supply and 
demand framework are only part of a bigger picture (Lauder, Brown and Cheung 2018), 
which likely includes labour market institutions, the regulatory environment, the composition 
of the national economy, and historical and geographical contexts. The many possible 
combinations of these factors ultimately exceeds the small the number of countries for which 
we have data, and we thus have only a partial picture of  a much larger set of processes. 
However, with particular respect to the argument that access to education should be reduced 
due to high levels of signalling, a simple examination of supply and demand is incisive.
Discussion
Our analysis uses international comparative data to problematize Caplan’s argument that 
“there’s way too much education” (Caplan, 2018, p. 1). Variation across countries in the 
relationships between educational qualifications, cognitive skills, and earnings shows that a 
high “signalling” value of qualifications is not inevitable; on the contrary, the 
disproportionate influence of qualifications over cognitive skills in determining incomes 
appears to be mainly a peculiarity of the United States. In many other countries, the benefits 
cognitive skills are broadly comparable with qualifications, this pattern holds whether we 
consider cognitive skills as in terms of variation within the population (i.e. being one standard 
deviation above normal) or as an outcome of the education systems of these countries. 
Particularly at the level of secondary education, the economic value of the skills from 
education is on par with the value of the qualification itself in many countries. 
Caplan has a stronger point in making a case against higher education in some countries. 
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Ironically, the countries where the signalling value of higher education is strongest are those 
countries with less education, not more. The signalling value of higher education is strongest 
in countries where access is lowest, and countries with higher levels of access to higher 
education tend to place more emphasis on cognitive skills rather than degrees. 
While some of the earnings premium for university degrees may be related to the job-specific 
skills that are not included in the analysis (in contrast to general cognitive skills), the 
significant cross-national variation in the relative contributions of cognitive skills and 
qualifications makes it improbable that all of the degree premium is related to specific skills. 
Some of these international differences might be explained by the quality of the education 
systems, with the argument that higher quality systems producer greater skills and higher 
qualifications earning premiums. However, the lack of corresponding differences in 
economic output or productivity makes the case for differences in the skills content of higher 
education improbable. Rather,  international variation suggests some degree of signalling is 
found in all most countries in the analysis, with particularly high levels in several countries.
The analysis above supports an approach to educational policy that provides widespread 
access to higher education. This sharply contrasts with Caplan’s (2018, p.6) recommendation 
that “we would be better off if education were less affordable,” as to achieve widespread 
access to higher education affordable access is a requisite. Given that elite universities and 
highly stratified systems are likely to lead to higher levels of signalling (Brown et al, 2012; 
Hoekstra, 2009), a relatively homogenous system with minimal status competition is the most 
likely way to reduce signalling. Even given these objectives, international evidence shows 
that different approaches are possible; countries such as Canada, New Zealand, Norway and 
Ireland all achieve high levels of access to higher education and low levels of signalling, but 
they have very different approaches to higher education policy and funding.
Limitations
In many sense, our analysis tends to overestimate signalling, as it attributes most of the 
earnings associated with a degree to signalling from qualifications rather than field-specific 
skills. Because our model includes only the basic cognitive skills measured by PIAAC and a 
very broad dummy variable for subject specification, we do not capture the specific and non-
cognitive skills that are important outcomes of education, particularly higher education. 
Instead, these are aggregated into the qualifications earning a premium, which actually 
bundles many benefits from education, including some degree of job market signalling.
A second limitation relates to the attribution of cognitive skills to education: as mentioned 
above, there is some assumption that these skills result from the given level of education. It is 
also possible that an individual’s ultimate educational attainment is partially determined by 
their cognitive skills. Our analysis accounts for this problem in attributing the source of 
cognitive skills by controlling for social background in estimating the cognitive skills gain 
from secondary and higher education. Thus, advantages in cognitive skills that come from 
home background are not attributed to education, but it is still possible that the development 
of cognitive skills from sources other than education (home, social environment, etc) are mis-
attributed to education.
Page 16 of 28
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/oxfordreview  Email: joanne.hazell@education.ox.ac.uk





























































For Peer Review Only
In the context of a comparative analysis of the contributions of qualifications and cognitive 
skills to earnings, these two limitations are somewhat complementary. The first tends to 
overestimate signalling by discounting all the other benefits of a degree such as specialized 
skills; the other tends to underestimate signalling by attributing cognitive skills to schools.
Conclusion
These limitations notwithstanding, our analysis is useful in illustrating cross-national 
variation in the relative contributions of qualifications and cognitive skills to earnings. We 
show that this variation is substantial and that any claim that education is either primarily 
about human capital or skills should be limited to a particular context rather than made 
universally. This finding also helps to explain and reconcile previous studies that yield 
differing results regarding the relationship between human capital and signalling (or the 
extent of overeducation), as these divergent results may be due to differences in the context 
of the study. Finally, our analysis provides a counter-intuitive approach to limiting signalling 
in labour markets: by making access to higher education more widely available.
A useful endeavour for future research would be to develop a more complete measure of the 
skills that result from higher education, including not only the general measures of cognitive 
skills analysed here but also specialised technical skills and non-cognitive skills such as 
intercultural communication and teamwork. Such a measurement would provide a more 
robust empirical framework for comparing human capital (in its entirety) and signalling in the 
labour market, rather than the analysis of cognitive skills (an important part of human capital 
theory) undertaken here. Developing a more complete picture of the bundle of skills and 
abilities imparted through higher education would lead to a more informed debate of the 
relative contributions of signalling and skills to labour market outcomes.
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Female  Secondary Education 0.272
(0.138)




Between Group Variation (σβ0) 0.323 0.319
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Appendix
This appendix reproduces Figures 2 and 3 using earnings thresholds set at different levels. It 
illustrates that the results are conceptually similar regardless of the earnings threshold used in 
the regression analysis.
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60th Percentile
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80th Percentile
Results for Monthly Earnings
As explained in the paper text, our analysis uses logistic regression analysis of the probability 
of attaining a given earnings percentile due to the limited coverage of raw earnings data. The 
plot below shows results from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for countries that 
report raw earnings data, using earnings per month in US Dollars, Purchasing Power Parity 
(USD PPP) as the dependent variable. The analysis includes the same set of control variables 
as Figure 2 in the paper text. This shows that our choice of earnings deciles as an outcome 
variable do not meaningfully alter our findings.
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Earnings Across All Qualifications 
The table below shows regression coefficients for all six levels of the ISCED qualification 
levels as coded in the PIAAC EDCAT6 variable. Coefficients are based on a logistic 
regression model using earning at the 70th percentile as the dependent variable, and the same 




















Austria (0.00) 0.783 1.157 1.436 1.073 2.235
Belgium (0.00) 0.384 0.405 0.981 1.472 2.046
Canada (0.00) -0.174 -0.041 0.373 0.933 1.510
Chile (0.00) 0.243 1.219 2.60 2.922 0.110
Czech Rep. (0.00) -0.116 0.306 0.754 0.31 0.621
Germany (0.00) 0.177 0.226 1.061 1.194 1.947
Denmark (0.00) -0.078 -0.034 0.415 1.127 1.602
Estonia (0.00) -0.106 -0.405 -0.429 -0.045 0.412
Finland (0.00) -0.373 0.435 0.150 0.506 1.686
UK (0.00) 0.196 -13.538 0.553 1.41 0.044
Greece (0.00) 0.425 0.522 0.803 1.565 1.728
Ireland (0.00) 0.413 0.139 0.806 1.945 2.246
Israel (0.00) 0.802 0.668 1.301 1.709 0.224
Japan (0.00) -0.225 -0.127 -0.239 0.466 1.259
Korea (0.00) 0.635 0.822 1.344 1.88 0.312
Lithuania (0.00) 0.684 0.760 0.962 1.536 2.036
Netherlands (0.00) -0.030 0.476 1.078 1.518 0.236
Norway (0.00) -0.116 0.267 0.858 0.828 1.515
N. Zealand (0.00) 0.374 0.273 0.585 1.138 1.497
Poland (0.00) 0.051 0.713 0.904 1.522 0.110
Russian Fed. (0.00) 0.998 0.838 -0.256 -1.163 0.194
Singapore (0.00) 0.804 0.64 1.601 2.393 3.082
Slovak Rep. (0.00) 0.874 0.66 1.253 2.112 0.056
Slovenia (0.00) 0.725 2.091 2.869 3.629 0.265
Sweden (0.00) -0.238 0.231 0.465 0.562 1.207
Turkey (0.00) 0.593 1.00 2.382 2.438 0.252
USA (0.00) 2.827 2.614 3.133 3.792 4.325
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